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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure confers jurisdiction on the Appellate 
Court. This rule states, "An appeal may be taken from the juvenile court to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment, order, or decree, except as otherwise provided by law; by 
filing a Notice of Appeal with the clerk of the juvenile court within 30 days after the entry 
of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from." UTAH R. Juv. P. 52(a). 
This case involves an appeal of an award of attorneys fees, costs, and expenses 
ordered by the Third District Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah in a child 
protective order proceeding. 
Pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Appellate Court is 
the proper court to review the juvenile court order. Id. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The Petition for Child Protective Order, filed by Brianne Cammack-White, Craig 
Cammack, and Sharon Cammack, shall be referred to as the "Cammack Petition." 
For purposes of referring to the Legal Index, all references relate to Legal Index I, 
unless otherwise stated. The Legal Index shall be referred to as the "Record." 
ISSUE 1: 
Whether the Cammack Petition, which was dismissed due to "insufficiency of the 
evidence," was "without merit," as required by Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Rule 
37(d), to justify the award of attorney's fees and costs. UTAH R. JUV. P. 37(d). 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the petition was "without merit" is a legal conclusion. "'Conclusions of 
law are reviewed by this court for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court.'" 
S.S.. 57 P.3d at 1132. See also M.M.J., 908 P.2d at 349. 
Citation to the Record: 
The Minutes and Order from the October 20, 2006 hearing, state, "Mrs. Huntsman 
moved the Court to dismiss the protective order based on the petition's failure to meet 
their burden of proof." Record at 258. Shortly thereafter, in the Minutes and Order, the 
court makes the following, "FINDINGS: The court finds that there has not been sufficient 
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evidence to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence the child has been abused or is 
in imminent threat of being abused." Id. at 259. 
ISSUE 2: 
Whether the Cammacks are immune from liability pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
62A-4a-410(l), which give immunity to "any person" who participates in good faith in 
making a report of child abuse, from liability that "otherwise might result by reason of 
those actions." 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the Cammacks are immune from liability under this statute is a question 
of law dependant on the interpretation of the statute in question. "We review questions of 
statutory interpretation for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's 
interpretation." AJE, 938 P.2d at 814 (citing M.M.J.. 908 P.2d at 349). 
Citations to the Record: 
In the Objection to the Award of Attorney's Fees to the Respondent, Record at 319 
- 328, the Cammacks argue: "Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (hereinafter UCA) §§ 
64A-4a-403 [sic], -410, -411 and -412 (see Attachments -the cited sections of the Utah 
Code), Petitioners had a duty to report the information reported to them by the child, 
which they did, and unless they were found to have lied (i.e., given a false report), they 
are not subject to any sanction by the court, including attorney's fees, for having reported 
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in good faith/' IcL at 319-20. (The correct citation is Title 62A, not 64A.) 
ISSUE 3: 
Whether the award of attorneys fees and costs should be reversed on grounds of 
public policy, because if this devastating judgment is affirmed, the public will decide that 
filing a child protective order is not worth the risk of being made to pay in excess of 
$20,000 in fees and costs, for simply trying to protect a child. 
Standard of Review: 
uWhen faced with a question of statutory construction, and in attempting to 
determine legislative intent, this court first looks to the plain language of the statute. In 
construing a statute, we assume that 'each term in the statute is used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable/ "Only if we find some ambiguity [in the statute's plain language] need we 
look further/ and only then 'need we seek guidance from the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations.'" J.C. v. State, 2004 P.3d (2004 UT App 255). 
Citations to the Record: 
The Cammacks did not argue public policy in the lower court. However, when 
considering that UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-410(l) gives immunity to persons who 
report possible child abuse, and when considering UTAH R. JUV. P. 37(d), which permits 
an award of attorney's fees if a petition is ''without merit/' there is definite ambiguity 
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between the two statutes. Both statutes were argued in the lower court, as heretofore 
stated, which gives the court the basis to now consider how public policy is affected by 
the ambiguous statutes. 
ISSUE 4: 
Whether the award of attorney's fees and costs should be reversed because they are 
not reasonable, as a judgment for over $20,000 for a child protective order action is 
highly excessive, and the juvenile court made no inquiry into factors such as the difficulty 
of the case, the number of hours billed, and the efficiency and experience of Ms. 
Huntsman. 
Standard of Review: 
"Historically, this court has generally reviewed a trial judge's decision on the issue 
of attorney fees for abuse of discretion." Salmon, 916 P.2d at 893. 
Citations to the Record: 
In the Objection to the Award of Attorney's Fees to the Respondent, Record at 319 
- 28, the Cammacks argue: ". . . much of Respondent's preparation, though extensive, 
was unwarranted as a practical matter." h i at 321. "Furthermore, the amount of 
attorney's fees requested by Respondent's counsel in this matter seems out of whack with 
the defense that would be considered adequate under the circumstances." Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATION 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62 A-4a-101(33) states, "'Unsubstantiated * means a judicial finding 
that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that abuse or neglect occurred." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(28) states, ^Substantiated' or Substantiation' means a 
judicial finding based on preponderance of the evidence that abuse or neglect occurred. 
Each allegation made or identified in a given case shall be considered separately in 
determining whether there should be a finding of substantiated/' 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(35) states, '^'Without merit' means a finding at the 
completion of an investigation by the division, or a judicial finding, that the alleged 
abuse, neglect, or dependency did not occur, of that the alleged perpetrator was not 
responsible for the abuse, neglect, or dependency." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-410(l) states, w'[a]ny person, official, or institution 
participating in good faith in making a report, taking photographs or X-rays, assisting an 
investigator from the division, serving as a member of a child protection team, or taking a 
child into protective custody pursuant to this part, is immune from any liability, civil or 
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criminal, that otherwise might result by reason of those actions. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-411 states, "[a]ny person, official, or institution required to 
report a case of suspected child abuse, child sexual abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol 
syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, who willfully fails to do so is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor..." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103(l)(cc) states, "'Substantiated' is as defined in Section 
62A-4a-101." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103(l)(gg) states, "'Unsubstantiated' is as defined in Section 
62A-4a-101." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103(l)(hh) states, '"Without merit' is as defined in Section 62-
4a~101." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-320(l) states, "Upon the filing with the court of a petition 
under Section 78-3a-305 by the Division of Child and Family Services or any interested 
person informing the court, among other things, that the division has made a supported 
finding that a person committed a severe type of child abuse or neglect as defined in 
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Section 62A-4a-1002, the court shall: 
(a) make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated, or without merit; 
(b) include the finding described in Subsection (l)(a) in a written order; and 
(c) deliver a certified copy of the order described in Subsection (1 )(b) to the 
division." 
Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. states, 4[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon... Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness. . ." 
Rule 37(d), Utah R. Juv. P., states, ". . .If the court finds that the petition is without merit, 
the respondent's costs and attorneys fees may be assessed against petitioner." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an award of attorneys fees and costs, from the juvenile court, 
in the context of a child protective order case. 
This case began when the Cammacks ["Cammacks" shall refer to Brianne 
Cammack-White (child's mother), Craig Cammack (child's maternal grandfather), and 
Sharon Cammack (child's maternal grandmother)) filed a Petition for Child Protective 
Order on behalf of the minor child, and against the child's father, Mr. Harbaugh. The 
Petition was signed by the Cammacks on July 13, 2006. Record at 43. The Cammacks 
were awarded an Ex Parte Protective Order on the same day (Record at 33), and then a Ex 
Parte Modified Protective Order on August 29, 2006 (Record at 173). 
Prior to the hearing on the merits (which was held October 20, 2006), Mr. 
Harbaugh filed an Order to Show Cause, requesting to find the Cammacks in contempt 
regarding cooperation with supervised his visits and for "a judgment against the 
Petitioners [Cammacks] for Mr. Harbaugh's attorney's fees incurred in drafting letters re: 
parent-time; and pursuing this motion..." Record at 197-8. 
On October 20, 2006, the Cammacks Petition was dismissed. (Record at 258). 
The court stated that the reason for the dismissal was "insufficiency of the evidence 
presented," and further that, "[t]he Court finds there has not been sufficient evidence to 
prove that by a preponderance of the evidence the child has been abused or is in imminent 
threat of being abused." Record at 258-9. 
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During the time prior to dismissal, and up to the day of dismissal of the protective 
order, Respondent submitted massive amounts of documents to the court, regardless of 
admissibility.1 
A hearing was held on Mr. Harbaugh's Order to Show Cause on December 4, 
2007, after the protective order was dismissed. See Transcripts for December 4, 2006 
hearing [hereinafter Transcripts], generally. The court heard argument on the contempt 
issue (interference with visitation), and then stated that *'[t]he Court is going to take this 
[contempt issue] under advisement as well as the attorney's fees issue." Transcripts at 
58-9. Both parties were permitted to submit their position on the issue of attorney's fees 
to the court in writing. Transcripts at 59-60. 
The only statute Mr. Harbaugh ever cited when making requests for attorney's fees 
and costs was UTAH R. JUV. P. 37(d). Ms. Huntsman's fees/costs were requested in an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. Record at 313.2 Respondent, Mr. Harbaugh, also requested 
costs he personally incurred, including $500 for a polygraph test he took, and $752.50 for 
'For example, Respondent submitted four different ^Submission of Documents" as 
the case evolved. Most of the documents submitted never had foundation laid and were 
inadmissible hearsay. Record at 117-39 (first submission), 184-90, 146-57 (second 
submission), 218-46 (third submission), 260-78 (fourth submission). 
2The Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, signed by Ms. Fluntsman on November 27, 
2006, states, 'w[t]he legal basis for the award of'respondent's costs and attorney's fees' in 
this case is Rule 37(d) of the UTAH RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE." 
In the original Motion for Order to Show Cause and related documents, there was 
no statutory basis given for the request for attorney's fees and costs. Record at 197-208. 
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supervised parent-time through WillWin. Record at 316.3 No legal basis was ever 
provided for an award of reimbursement for a polygraph test and visitation supervision 
costs. 
Mr. Unrau, prior counsel for the Cammacks, filed an Objection to the Award of 
Attorney's Fees to the Respondent.4 Record at 319 - 28. In the objection, Mr. Unrau 
argued that the fees were not reasonable and that the Cammacks should have immunity. 
Id. Mr. Unrau also gave the court many factual reasons why the petition had merit.5 id. 
After Ms. Huntsman submitted a Reply to Objection to the Award of Attorney's 
Fees to the Respondent (Record at 355-60), and a Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's 
Fees (Record at 361-64), the Court awarded fees as follows: 
a. $19,187.28, which was Ms. Huntsman's fees and costs for the entire 
protective order case and which included $1,987.00 for the "order to show 
cause" portion of the case, and 
3The Affidavit of Respondent's Costs, signed by Mr. Harbaugh on November 27, 
2006, states, ". . .1 paid $500 to have a polygraph examination administered by Virgil 
Johnson. . . I was forced to pay for supervised parent-time through WillWin. The cost of 
such supervision was $752.50." 
4Numerous defenses were given, including the immunity defense (Record at 329-
30) and the unreasonableness of fees (Record 330-31). 
5For example, Mr. Unrau stated, '"DCFS in Manti did an investigation which 
substantiated the report of child [that the child was abused by Mr. Harbaugh]." Further, 
"[a]t the trial, Petitioners' [Cammack's] counsel motioned the Court to listen to the audio 
recording of the interview, and the Court declined." "In the mean time, the child had 
disclosed Respondent's [Mr. Harbaugh's] acts to other parties, whose Affidavits were on 
file with the Court at the time of trial." 
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b. $1,252.50, representing Mr. Harbaugh's expenses. ($500 for the polygraph 
test he took, and $752.50 for expenses for his supervised visitation.) 
Record at 365-6. The court awarded the fees and costs pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules 
of Juvenile Procedure (Record at 365), which requires that the Petition for Protective 
Order be "without merit." 
The Cammacks appeal the juvenile court's decision to award Mr. Harbaugh his 
attorney's fees and costs. The court never made a finding that the Cammack Petition was 
"without merit." In fact, the court found that the Cammack Petition was dismissed for 
insufficiency of evidence, or in other words, the petition was "unsubstantiated." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 1: 
The Cammack Petition was dismissed because the Cammacks did not produce 
enough evidence for the juvenile court to issue the protective order. This is called 
"unsubstantiation." UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(33). Rule 37(d), UTAH RULES OF 
JUVENILE PROCEDURE only permits an award of attorney's fees and costs to a respondent 
in a protective order action if the petition is "without merit," which is the equivalent to 
exoneration for the respondent. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(35). In this case, 
the petition was dismissed "due to the insufficiency of the evidence presented," in the 
court's exact words. There was never a finding of "without merit," and therefore, the 
award of attorney's fees and costs was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 2: 
The Cammacks are immune from liability pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
410(1). This statute gives immunity to "any person" who makes a report of child abuse 
from "any liability" . . . "that otherwise might result by reason of these actions." IcL 
Much of Ms. Huntsman's billings resulted from the Cammack's report of child abuse to 
DCFS. Ms. Huntsman spent time calling DCFS and making GRAMA requests. See 
Record at 281-310. These are the types of actions Ms. Huntsman would take to defend a 
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report of child abuse. The Cammacks should therefore be given immunity from liability. 
ARGUMENT 3: 
Public policy does not support the court's award of attorneys fees and costs. The 
public has an interest in protecting children. If this award of attorney's fees is affirmed, 
people who may potentially file a petition for protective order, in good faith as the 
Cammacks did, will hesitate to file for fear that the result could be a devastating monetary 
judgment entered against them. 
ARGUMENT 4: 
Prior to awarding attorney's fees and costs, the court must make a determination 
that the fees and costs are reasonable. Salmon, 916 P.2d at 893. Fees and costs of over 
$20,000, for a protective order case lasting less than one year, is outrageously high and 
not reasonable. The court did not inquire into many factors of reasonableness, such as 
efficiency and experience of Ms. Huntsman, and reasonableness of the number of hours 
she billed, and whether the course of action she took in the case was actually necessary. 
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ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 1: The Cammack Petition Was Dismissed Due to Insufficiency of 
Evidence; It Was NOT Dismissed for Lack of Merit Attorney's Fees and Costs May 
Only Be Awarded Under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure if a Petition is 
"Without Merit" 
The juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Harbaugh attorney's fees 
and costs. The juvenile court made an error of law and must be reversed. 
Rule 37, UTAH RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, is the statute that the juvenile 
court based its award of attorneys fees and costs. This statute states in pertinent part, "|i]f 
the court finds in the hearing that petition is without merit, the respondent's costs and 
attorneys fees may be assessed against the petitioner [emphasis added]." Id. As such, 
prior to awarding Mr. Harbaugh attorney's fees and costs under Rule 37. the court must 
first make a "find[ing]" that the Cammack's petition was "without merit/' Otherwise, 
attorney's fees and costs may not be awarded under this rule. 
The juvenile court did not make a finding that the Cammack's petition was 
"without merit." The reason for dismissal of the Cammack petition, according to the 
juvenile court itself, was insufficiency of evidence ("unsubstantiation"), which is very 
different from "without merit." See Record at 258-9. 
In order to understand the term, "without merit," one must also understand the 
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terms "unsubstantiated" and "substantiated." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-320(l)6. 
The terms, "substantiated," "unsubstantiated," and "without merit," are defined in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101.7 The definitions are as follows: 
a. "'Substantiated' means "a judicial finding based on preponderance of the 
evidence that abuse or neglect occurred. Each allegation made or identified 
in a given case shall be considered separately in determining whether there 
should be a finding of substantiated." UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(28); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103(l)(cc). In substantiated cases, a protective 
order should be issued.8 
b. "'Unsubstantiated' means a judicial finding that there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that abuse or neglect occurred [emphasis added]." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(33); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-
103(l)(gg). In unsubstantiated cases, a protective order will not be issued. 
c. "'Without merit' means a finding at the completion of an investigation by 
the division, or a judicial finding, that the alleged abuse, neglect, or 
6 Under this statute, the court should differentiate the findings in certain child 
protective order cases between three options: "make a finding of [either (1)] 
substantiated, [2] unsubstantiated, or [3] without merit. . ." See Vigil v. DCFS, 107 P.3d 
716, generally, for discussion of substantiated, unsubstantiated, and without merit. 
7Said definitions are incorporated into child protective order proceedings through 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103(l). 
8See Goodrich, 2005 UT App 418, for a discussion of "substantiated." 
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dependency did not occur, of that the alleged perpetrator wasnot 
responsible for the abuse, neglect or dependency [emphasis added]." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(35); 1IT M I CODE ANN § 78-3a-
c a s e s , a p m i u l> « UMK \ ^ \\\ n<»i IN, n- ut/u. 
The juvenile court, in its "Findings and Order Regarding Order to Show Cause and 
Request for Attorneys Fees," appears confused regarding the difference between (Iic 
tenns "without merit" and "unsubstantiated." See Record at 365-6. The court concludes, 
•in « » M i v l l \ ' h i t l \\\ i i i i s c f lu ( ' j t i n n m i k I M i l i o i i n J S ' i l i s i i i i k , t l . I lml . . h . l i n l i h '»r i 
automatically deemed "without merit." See Id Just because a petition is dismissed does 
not Inean that it is "without merit." Both "unsubstantiated" petitions and "without merit" 
petitions will he dismissed. The Cammack Petition was dismissed, because it was 
because it was "w; 
After understanding the difference between the terms "unsubstantiated" and 
"without merit," it becomes obvious that the "Findings and Order Regarding Order to 
Show Cause and Request for Attorneys Fees," are clearly erroneous. The Minutes and 
Order, signed by the court on October-20, 2006, state that tl ic Can in lack Pel itk »f i v ;as 
dismissed because there had not been "sufficient evidence to prove that by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the child has been abused or is in imminent threat of 
b e i n g a b u s e d . " R e c o n l <ti /|,|»*11 l i n n , in \\w I i i n l i i n » s . m d < "Tilti R i ' i M u l i t i ; 1 O u l u i o 
Show Cause and Request for Attorneys Fees, signed by the court oii January 11, 2007, the 
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court reaffinns the "unsubstantiation" stating, "[o]n October 20, 2006 this court dismissed 
the Exparte Protective Order issued on August 15, 2006 and denied issuing the Child 
Protective 0[r]der due to the insufficiency of the evidence presented [emphasis added]/' 
Record at 365. As already stated, the definition for "unsubstantiated" is "a judicial 
finding that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the abuse or neglect occurred 
[emphasis added]." UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101(33); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-
103(1 )(gg). The very statement made by the court in this order, giving the reason for 
dismissal, is the very definition of "unsubstantiated," which, in turn, is the precise reason 
why the petition cannot be "without merit." The court never made a finding that 
exonerated Mr. Harbaugh, or found that he did not commit abuse, as is required in a 
"without merit" finding. The court simply found that the Cammacks did not present 
enough evidence to show that Mr. Harbaugh abused the child. Since no finding of 
"without merit" was made, and since the court admits that the petition was dismissed due 
to "insufficiency of evidence," the award of attorney's fees and costs is clear legal error, 
an abuse of discretion, and must be reversed. 
On a side note, even if the juvenile court did make a conclusion that the petition 
was "without merit," it would need to be reversed due to inadequate findings, 
"Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. provides that c[i |n all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
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its conclusions of law thereon.. . [emphasis a d d e d ] ' " 9 Woodward , 823 P.2d at 477. 
There is extensive case law requiring the ecu it t to state the facts and reasons fi illy it i 
a.[ )fi! o{ )i ii lie I i:i idii lgs ai id c 01 ich isions 10 In order support a conclusion of "withoi it meri t ," 
faQ C( )ur l w o u j c j j l a v e ;I i e e ( j e ( j | 0 ^ k c or i < *viden< n : ai id i r lake 11 f idii igi: ; to \ )roclaii i lir lg Is 4r. 
Marbaugh 's innocence. The court never made any such findings or took on any such 
evidence. Dismissal was due to "insufficiency of evidence ," as the court stated; Mi 
Marl >ai igl i was not exonerated. Therefore, inadequate findings are also an additional 
reason for reversal , if the lower court did mainia. . . •. ^ -;- jt 
meri t ." 
1SS1 J1 1 2: I he Cammacks are Entitled to Immunity of Liability From Attorney's 
Fees and Costs pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-410(l), because the 
yRule^2(ai I'I P is .ippluuhk Ii i |ii\ tiiilt: proceedings. N.H.B., 777 
P.2dat493. 
,0
". . .[T]o ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons 
for the court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions." 
Sutkin, 842 P.2d at 923-4 citing Painter. 752 P.2d at 909. See also Hah, 858 P.2d at 
1021. u[D]etailed findings are necessary to determine whether the trial court has 
exercised its discretion in a rational manner," as opposed to abusing its discretion. See id. 
citing Sukm, 842 P.2d at 924. "We review the juvenile court's findings of fact under a 
'clearly erroneous' standard. See. Utah R. App. P. 52(a). 'An appellant seeking to 
challenge the juvenile court's findings must first marshal the evidence in support of those 
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the court's ruling, is insufficient." K.A.M.. 2004 UT App 48. See also VigiL 81 5 P.2d 
at 1298 (stating that for a questions of fact, the "clearly erroneous standard - - noii mg 
more and nothing less - - should be applied."). 
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Cammacks Actions and Ms. Huntsman's Billings Involved Directly the Report of 
Child Abuse. 
The Cammacks are immune from liability pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
410(1). This statute protects "[a]ny person" who participates in good faith in "making a 
report" of child abuse, and it furthermore provides for said person immunity from "any 
liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result by reason of those actions." 
Although the Cammacks filed a child protective order in addition to reporting suspected 
abuse to DCFS, a large amount of Ms. Huntsman's billings involved defense directly 
related to the report of child abuse made to DCFS. For example, on the first page of her 
billings, it states, "7/21/2006 . . . Conversation with D. Huntsman re: GRAMA requests. 
Conversation with client's father about GRAMA request and requesting client to call." 
Record at 281. The GRAMA request work done by Ms. Huntsman directly resulted from 
the report made to DCFS about the suspected child abuse. On the same page, "7/20/2006 
. . . Phone call from client re: protective order, DCFS, etc." id. And on the second page, 
"7/21/2006 . . . Phone calls with client re: cooperating with DCFS, results of motion, 
advice, etc." Id Much of this work stemmed directly from the report made by the 
Cammacks of the alleged abuse. It would be very difficult to say which minutes of Ms. 
Huntsman's time were the result of the protective order filing, and which results were the 
result of the DCFS reporting, because the work is tightly related. But the fact remains, 
that statute provides mandatory immunity to "any person" for "any liability" "that might 
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result by reason of these actions." I he CamiiiauM* MIUUIU DC giveii irnnluility ol liability 
under I JTAH CODE ANN. § 62A 4i i. 410(1) 
ISSUK 3: T h e I Viiey Embodied in f title 62A, Which Gives Immunity f 01 Pei^ons 
Who Report Child Abuse, Conflicts With the Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure, which Permits an Award of Attorney's Fees Against a Reporting Party if 
the Petition is " Without Merit/' Due to the Ambiguity of the Two Statutes When 
Read ' I 'ogethei , the Court Should Look to Underlying Public 1 *olicy ai id Reverse the 
Award of Fees, Because Said Award of Fees Will Have a Chilling Effect on Persons 
Considering to Report Possible Child Abuse. 
I- i iblic policy si ipports a. reversal of the award ol attorney's fees and costs. Hie 
(jammacks were trying to protect a d lild. The public shouiu DC encouraged to pursue 
protective orders for children they believe are being abused. Utah even has statute to 
protect certain individuals from liability when reporting child abuse. UTAH CODE ANN. § 
62A-4a-410(l) states, "|a]i IY pei soi i, official or institi ition participating in good 
making a report, taking photographs or X-rays, assisting an investigator from the division, 
serving as a member of a child protection team, or taking a child into protective custody 
pursuant to this part, is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might 
<*v even ( ) 
are required to report cases of suspected child abuse, and who willfully fail to do so, are 
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guilty of a class B misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-411. The existence of 
these statutes (the immunity of liability, and penalty imposed for failure to report) make 
the public's policy clear: Individuals should be encouraged to take steps necessary to 
protect children from suspected abuse. If the court's award of attorney's fees and costs is 
not reversed, it will send a clear and unfortunate message to the public. The public will 
hesitate before (or even decide against) taking steps to protect children. After having this 
devastating judgment entered against them, the Cammacks will probably never file 
another child protective order again. Who could blame them? 
ISSUE 4: The Award of Fees Must Be Reversed Because the Court Failed to 
Adequately Inquire into Reasonableness Factors, and Because the Fees Were Too 
High for the Case. 
The Attorney's fees and costs were unreasonable and must be reversed on this 
basis. An award of attorney fees must be reasonable. Salmon, 916 P.2d at 893 (citing 
Cottonwood Mall 830 P.2d at 269). 'This court has set out several factors which trial 
courts should consider in determining whether the requested attorney fees are reasonable. 
Those factors include, but are not limited to, 
f,the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the 
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case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of" (In alh >nu-\ s 
* > , . . •." IdL at 269 (quoting Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 625). 
Iti aslant case, the juvenile court never considered any of these factors except Ms. 
1 huH1 >n "i1" ; let p n i | t I( " ' i 1 1 i'« i "1 '• < i111111 ' i i l n i H i H M' » M 'M ' , i i K i m 1 1 , p1 M f o 
awarding over $20,000 in attorneys fees, was: 
"The respondent has requested attorneys fees which are allowed under the rule 
[Juvenile Procedure Rule 37]. This request was accompanied by the affidavits of 
counsel and Mr. Harbaugh. The Court finds the fees request to be reasonable. The 
respondent had to prepare a defense to the Exparte [sic] Protective Order. Their 
preparation was extensive but cannot be characterized as unwarranted as the 
petitioners^] counsel states in his objection, since respondent had lost temporary 
custody and needed to prepare to defend himself against allegation of abuse." 
Record at 365-6. The court did not consider the difficulty of the litigation. The court did 
not conoid. untsman's level of efficiency and expertise. The court did not 
considc i: • • ableness ot tl lie i iui i it: )ci c I I IOI n s IV Is I In in itsi n a n c l a i i i is t :> 1 i io '< : pi it ii it :» 
the case. The court did not look into whether all of the preparation was necessary, or 
legally required. Ms. Huntsman submitted many affidavits and documents to the court 
or a fee award this large, and in a case where the petitioners' 
primary goal is to protect a child, wherein the petitioners are not out foi the :h owi I s< Hf-
1
'Respondent submitted four different and extensive "Submission ol Documents" 
as the case evolved. Most of the documents submitted never had foundation laid and 
were inadmissible hearsay. Record at 117-39 (first submission), 184-90, 146-57 (second 
submission), 218-46 (third submission), 260-78 (fourth submission). 
None of the people who submitted affidavits, with the exception of Mr. Harbaugh, 
ever testified. Therefore, the affidavits were inadmissible hearsay, shoiildrv t have been 
considered by the court, and arguably unnecessary legal work. 
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interest, the court should make a deeper inquiry into reasonableness of fees. No 
reasonable judge would have made an award of over $20,000 in fees in a case like this. 
The fee award was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed. 
With regard to the $1,252.50 that Mr. Harbaugh was awarded as his costs, his 
affidavit dated November 27, 2006, states that these costs consist of $500 for his 
polygraph test, and $752.50 for his supervised parent-time costs through *cWillWin." 
Record at 316. Mr. Harbaugh has provided no authority stating that these types of costs 
are allowed under Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. It is the Cammack's 
assertion that they are not allowed under the law, and it was therefore, not reasonable that 
they be awarded.12 
12Not every type of out-of-pocket expense is reimbursable as fees/costs, hov 
example, in the context of divorces, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 permits an award of costs 
and attorneys fees. But not all costs are allowed. See Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Appraisal 
and accounting fees which were incurred in preparation for divorce trial could not be 
awarded as costs; Expenses incurred in divorce action due to copying, word processing, 
courier services, local travel, litigation support, business meal and miscellaneous search 
should not have been awarded as costs, inasmuch as expenses were not provided by 
statute. Even some deposition costs are not allowed.); Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Appraisal 
expenses incurred by wife during divorce proceeding, to learn value of husband's 
business interests, assets and liabilities, while perhaps necessary to wife's presentment of 
her case, were not 'costs' within meaning of statute which would allow her recovery of 
those expenses from husband.). 
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CONCLUSION 
Issue 1: 
"1 lie Cammack Petition was disn lissed be xai is< i it was "unsubstai itiatec !"' ': i not 
because it was "without merit." Rule 37(d), Utah R. Juv. P. only permits an award of fees 
if the petition was "without merit." As such, the award of fees was clear error and an 
abuse :»f c lisci etioi it at i :J i i n ist be reversed. 
Issue 2: 
The Cammacks are immune from liability pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-
11()( 1), 1 1: lis st:: iti ilc protects individi lals who re* ise from having civil 
liability, including attorneys fees and costs. A large part of Ms. Huntsman's fees and 
costs were incurred as a direct result, and were incurred or "resultfed] by reason of those 
actions/' As such, the court of appeals should reverse the award of fees based on 
v. 
The award of fees si"- u; he reversed on grounds of public policy. T1K ; . >Mc 
should be encouraged to take action to protect children, which polic) is emm 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-410(l) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-411. If the award of 
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fees is not reversed, the public will become hesitant in taking action to protect children, 
such as filing child protective orders, since the result could mean devastating liability for 
attorneys fees and costs. 
Issue 4: 
The award of attorneys fees and costs should be reversed because they are not 
reasonable. A court should make inquiry into several factors, such as reasonableness of 
hours spent, and expertise of counsel, prior to awarding fees, and necessity of fees. In a 
case such as this, where the award of fees exceeded $20,000, and where the Cammacks 
were acting selflessly, to protect a child, the court should have made a deeper inquiry into 
the fees, rather than just looking at the billing statement submitted by Ms. Huntsman and 
a making a short statement about how Mr. Harbaugh needed to prepare a defense, 
regardless of extensiveness. 
July 11
 f?orp 
Heather M. Ja-s j . 
M l O&NEY^FOR. APPELLANTS 
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ADDENDUM 
\! iwn CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1953, as amended). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § < \ .-;<t-!°W1953, as amended). 
b , 953, as ai i. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-4 i i v i 953, as amended). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-103 (1953. as amended). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-320 (1953, as amended). 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
UTAH R. JUV. P. 37(d). 
UTAH R. JUV. P. 52(a). 
Minutes and < >uler, hearing held on October . >06. 
Findings anu Order Regarding Order to Show Cause an< •uest for icvs Fees. 
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30-3-3 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 30 - Husband and Wife 
Chapter 03 - Divorce 
30-3-3 Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony. 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an order of 
custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for 
costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, during the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children 
in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be amended 
during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
62A-4a-101 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 62A - Utah Human Services Code 
Chapter 04a - Child and Family Services 
62A-4a-101 Definitions. 
62A-4a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Abuse" means: 
(i) actual or threatened nonaccidental physical or mental harm; 
(ii) negligent treatment; 
(iii) sexual exploitation; or 
(iv) any sexual abuse. 
(b) "Abuse" does not include: 
(i) reasonable discipline or management of a child, including withholding privileges; 
(ii) conduct described in Section 76-2-401; or 
(iii) the use of reasonable and necessary physical restraint or force on a child: 
(A) in self-defense; 
(B) in defense of others; 
(C) Ic J i rrc >tect tl ic cl i i ! ::!:; or -
(D) to remove a weapon in the possession of a child for any of the reasons described in Subsections 
(l)(b)(iii)(A) through (C). 
(2) "Adoption services" means: 
(a) placing children for adoption; 
(b) subsidizing adoptions under Sectioi i 62 i 4a I us; 
(c) supervising adoption placements until the adoption is finalized by the court; 
(d) conducting adoption studies; 
(e) preparing adoption reports upon request ui uic IUUH, emu 
(f) providing postadoptive placement services, upon request of a family, for the purpose of 
stabilizing a possible disruptive placement. 
(3) "Board" means the Board of Child and Family Services established in accordance with Sections 
62A-1-105, 62A-1-107, and 62A-4a-102. 
(4) "Child" means, except as provided in Part 7, Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, a 
person under 18 years of age. 
(5) "Consumer" means a person who receives services offered by the division in accordance with 
this chapter. 
(6) "Chronic physical abuse" means repeated or patterned physical abuse. 
(7) "Chronic neglect" means a repeated or patterned failure or refusal by a parent, guardian, or 
custodian to provide necessary care for a child's safety, morals, or well-being. 
(8) "Chronic emotional abuse" means repeated or patterned emotional abuse. 
(9) "Custody," with regard to the division, means the custody of a minor in the division as of the date 
of disposition. 
(10) "Day-care services" means care of a child for a portion of the day which is less than 24 hours: 
(a) in the child's own home by a responsible person; or 
(b) outside of the child's home in a: 
(i) day-care center; 
(ii) family group home; or 
(iii) family child care home. 
(11) "Dependent child" or "dependency" means a child, or the condition of a child, who is homeless 
or without proper care through no fault of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. 
(12) "Director" means the director of the Division of Child and Family Services. 
(13) "Division" means the Division of Child and Family Services. 
(14) (a) "Domestic violence services" means: 
(i) temporary shelter, treatment, and related services to persons who are victims of abuse and their 
dependent children; and 
(ii) treatment services for domestic violence perpetrators. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (14): 
(i) "abuse" means the same as that term is defined in Section 30-6-1; and 
(ii) "domestic violence perpetrator" means a person who is alleged to have committed, has been 
convicted of, or has pled guilty to an act of domestic violence as defined in Section 77-36-1. 
(15) "Homemaking service" means the care of individuals in their domiciles, and help gi\ c,:: !< > 
individual caretaker relatives to achieve improved household and family management through 
services of a trained homemaker. 
(16N " M u IM " means, except as provided in Part 7, Interstate Compact on Placement of Children: 
(a) a cl ^ >r 
(b) a person: 
(i) * • '1 ic is I it lez t -if 18 years of age and younger than 21 years of age; and 
(ii) for whom the division has been specifically ordered by the juvenile court to provicu ices. 
(17) "Natural parent" means a minor's biological or adoptive parent, and includes a minor's 
noncustodial parent. 
(18) (a) "Neglect" means: 
(i) iibainluniiit ill ul ,i child, except as provided in Part 8, Safe Relinquishment of aNewborn Child; 
(ii) subjecting a child to mistreatment or abuse; 
(iii) lack of proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or custodian; 
(iv) failure or refusal of a parent, guardian, or custodian to provide proper or necessary subsistence, 
education, or medical care, including surgery or psychiatric services when required, or any other care 
necessary for the child's health, safety, morals, or well-being; or 
(v) a child at risk of being neglecti ^cd because a; '; neglected 
or abused. 
(b) The aspect of neglect relating to education, described in Subsection (18)(a)(iv), means that, after 
receiving notice that a child has been frequently absent from school without good cause, or that the child 
has failed to cooperate with school authorities in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to make 
a good faith effort to ensure that the child receives an appropriate education 
(c) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious beliefs and . . reason does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a child, is not guilty of neglect. 
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (18)(a), a health care decision made for a child by the child's 
parent or guardian does not constitute neglect unless the state or other party to the proceeding shows, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the health care decision is not reasonable and informed. 
(ii) Nothing in Subsection (18)(d)(i) may prohibit a parent or guardian from exercising the right to 
obtain a second health care opinion. 
(19) "Protective custody," with regard to the division, means the shelter of a child by the division 
from the time the child is removed from the child's home until the earlier of: 
(a) the shelter hearing; or 
(b) the child's return home. 
(20) "Protective services" means expedited services that are provided: 
(a) in response to evidence of neglect, abuse, or dependency of a child; 
(b) to a cohabitant who is neglecting or abusing a child, in order to: 
(i) help the cohabitant develop recognition of the cohabitant's duty of care and of the causes of 
neglect or abuse; and 
(ii) strengthen the cohabitant's ability to provide safe and acceptable care; and 
(c) in cases where the child's welfare is endangered: 
(i) to bring the situation to the attention of the appropriate juvenile court and law enforcement 
agency; 
(ii) to cause a protective order to be issued for the protection of the child, when appropriate; and 
(iii) to protect the child from the circumstances that endanger the child's welfare including, when 
appropriate: 
(A) removal from the child's home; 
(B) placement in substitute care; and 
(C) petitioning the court for termination of parental rights. 
(21) "Severe neglect" means neglect that causes or threatens to cause serious harm to a child. 
(22) "Shelter care" means the temporary care of a minor in a nonsecure facility. 
(23) "State" means: 
(a) a state of the United States; 
(b) the District of Columbia; 
(c) the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
(d) the Virgin Islands; 
(e) Guam; 
(f) the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; or 
(g) a territory or possession administered by the United States. 
(24) "Severe emotional abuse" means emotional abuse that causes or threatens to cause serious harm 
to a child. 
(25) "Severe physical abuse" means physical abuse that causes or threatens to cause serious harm to 
a child. 
(26) "State plan" means the written description of the programs for children, youth, and family 
services administered by the division in accordance with federal law. 
(27) "Status offense" means a violation of the law that would not be a violation but for the age of the 
offender. 
(28) "Substantiated" or "substantiation" means a judicial finding based on a preponderance of the 
evidence that abuse or neglect occurred. Each allegation made or identified in a given case shall be 
considered separately in determining whether there should be a finding of substantiated. 
(29) "Substitute care" means: 
(a) the placement of a minor in a family home, group care facility, or other placement outside the 
minor's own home, either at the request of a parent or other responsible relative, or upon court order, 
when it is determined that continuation of care in the minor's own home would be contrary to the 
minor's welfare; 
(b) services provided for a minor awaiting placement; and 
(c) the licensing and supervision of a substitute care facility. 
(30) "Supported" means a finding by the division based on the evidence available at the completion 
of an investigation that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that abuse, neglect, or dependency 
occurred. Each allegation made or identified during the course of the investigation shall be considered 
separately in determining whether there should be a finding of supported. 
(31) "Temporary custody," with regard to the division, means the custody of a child in the division 
from the date of the shelter hearing until disposition. 
(32) "Transportation services" means travel assistance given to an individual with escort service, if 
necessary, to and from community facilities and resources as part of a service plan. 
(33)"Unsubstantiated" means a judicial finding that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that 
abusej^r neglect occurred. 
(34) "Unsupported" means a finding at the completion of an investigation that there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that abuse, neglect, or dependency occurred. However, a finding of unsupported 
means also that the division worker did not conclude that the allegation was without merit. 
(35) "WifcouLmfirit" means a finding at the completion of an investigation by the division, or a 
judicial finding, that the alleged abuse, neglect, or dependency did not occur, or that the alleged 
perpetrator was not responsible for the abuse, neglect, or dependency. 
Amended by Chapter 75, 2006 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 281, 2006 General Session 
62A-4a-410 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 62A - Utah Human Services Code 
Chapter 04a - Child and Family Services 
62A-4a-410 Immunity from liability. 
62A-4a-410. Immunity from liability. 
(1) Any person, official, or institution participating in good faith in making a report, taking 
photographs or X-rays, assisting an investigator from the division, serving as a member of a child 
protection team, or taking a child into protective custody pursuant to this part, is immune from any 
liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result by reason of those actions. 
(2) This section does not provide immunity with respect to acts or omissions of a governmental 
employee except as provided in Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
Amended by Chapter 102, 2005 General Session 
62A-4a-411 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 62A - Utah Human Services Code 
Chapter 04a - Child and Family Services 
62A-4a-411 Failure to report - Criminal penalty. 
62A-4a-411. Failure to report — Criminal penalty. 
Any person, official, or institution required to report a case of suspected child abuse, child sexual 
abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, who willfully fails to do so is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor. Action for failure to report must be commenced within four years from the date 
of knowledge of the offense and the willful failure to report. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 260, 1994 General Session 
78-3a-103 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 78 - Judicial Code 
Chapter 03a - Juvenile Court Act of 1996 
78-3a-103 Definitions. 
78-3a-103. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Abused child" includes a child who: 
(i) has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, 
or sexual exploitation; or 
(ii) has been the victim of any sexual abuse. 
(b) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incorporated in a decree, that the facts alleged in 
the petition have been proved. 
(c) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or over, except that a person 18 years or over under the 
continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-121 shall be referred to as a 
minor. 
(d) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court Judges. 
(e) "Child" means a person under 18 years of age. 
(f) "Child placement agency" means: 
(i) a private agency licensed to receive a child for placement or adoption under this code; or 
(ii) a private agency that receives a child for placement or adoption in another state, which agency is 
licensed or approved where such license or approval is required by law. 
(g) "Clandestine laboratory operation" is as defined in Section 58-37d-3. 
(h) "Commit" means, unless specified otherwise: 
(i) with respect to a child, to transfer legal custody; and 
(ii) with respect to a minor who is at least 18 years of age, to transfer custody. 
(i) "Court" means the juvenile court. 
(j) "Dependent child" includes a child who is homeless or without proper care through no fault of the 
child's parent, guardian, or custodian. 
(k) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer of legal custody by the court from a parent or the 
parents or a previous legal custodian to another person, agency, or institution. 
(1) "Detention" means home detention and secure detention as defined in Section 62A-7-101 for the 
temporary care of a minor who requires secure custody in a physically restricting facility: 
(i) pending court disposition or transfer to another jurisdiction; or 
(ii) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the court. 
(m) "Division" means the Division of Child and Family Services. 
(n) "Formal referral" means a written report from a peace officer or other person informing the court 
that a minor is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction and that a petition may be filed. 
(o) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological and social counseling of one or more 
persons in the group, depending upon the recommendation of the therapist. 
(p) "Guardianship of the person" includes the authority to consent to: 
(i) marriage; 
(ii) enlistment in the armed forces; 
(iii) major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment; or 
(iv) legal custody, if legal custody is not vested in another person, agency, or institution. 
(q) "Habitual truant" is as defined in Section 53A-l 1-101. 
(r) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying the following rights and duties: 
(i) the right to physical custody of the minor; 
(ii) the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the minor; 
(iii) the duty to provide the minor with food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; 
(iv) the right to determine where and with whom the minor shall live; and 
(v) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery or other extraordinary care. 
(s) "Minor" means: 
(i) a child; or 
(ii) a person who is: 
(A) at least 18 years of age and younger than 21 years of age; and 
(B) under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(t) "Natural parent" means a minor's biological or adoptive parent, and includes the minor's 
noncustodial parent. 
(u) (i) "Neglected child" means a child: 
(A) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has abandoned the child, except as provided in Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a, Part 8, Safe Relinquishment of a Newborn Child; 
(B) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has subjected the child to mistreatment or abuse; 
(C) who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or 
custodian; 
(D) whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsistence, 
education, or medical care, including surgery or psychiatric services when required, or any other care 
necessary for health, safety, morals, or well-being; 
(E) who is at risk of being a neglected or abused child as defined in this chapter because another 
child in the same home is a neglected or abused child as defined in this chapter; or 
(F) whose parent permits the minor to reside, on a permanent or temporary basis, at the location of a 
clandestine laboratory operation. 
(ii) The aspect of neglect related to education, described in Subsection (l)(u)(i)(D), means that, after 
receiving notice that a child has been frequently absent from school without good cause, or that the child 
has failed to cooperate with school authorities in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to make 
a good faith effort to ensure that the child receives an appropriate education. 
(iii) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious beliefs and who, for that reason, does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a child, is not guilty of neglect. 
(iv) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(u)(i), a health care decision made for a child by the child's 
parent or guardian does not constitute neglect unless the state or other party to the proceeding shows, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the health care decision is not reasonable and informed. 
(v) Nothing in Subsection (l)(u)(iv) may prohibit a parent or guardian from exercising the right to 
obtain a second health care opinion. 
(v) "Nonjudicial adjustment" means closure of the case by the assigned probation officer without 
judicial determination upon the consent in writing of: 
(i) the assigned probation officer; and 
(ii) (A) the minor; or 
(B) the minor and the minor's parent, legal guardian, or custodian. 
(w) "Probation" means a legal status created by court order following an adjudication on the ground 
of a violation of law or under Section 78-3a-104, whereby the minor is permitted to remain in the 
minor's home under prescribed conditions and under supervision by the probation department or other 
agency designated by the court, subject to return to the court for violation of any of the conditions 
prescribed. 
(x) "Protective supervision" means a legal status created by court order following an adjudication on 
the ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency, whereby the minor is permitted to remain in the minor's 
home, and supervision and assistance to correct the abuse, neglect, or dependency is provided by the 
probation department or other agency designated by the court. 
(y) (i) "Residual parental rights and duties" means those rights and duties remaining with the parent 
after legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in another person or agency, including: 
(A) the responsibility for support; 
(B) the right to consent to adoption; 
(C) the right to determine the child's religious affiliation; and 
(D) the right to reasonable parent-time unless restricted by the court. 
(ii) If no guardian has been appointed, "residual parental rights and duties" also include the right to 
consent to: 
(A) marriage; 
(B) enlistment; and 
(C) major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment. 
(z) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services, that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders committed to 
the division for custody and rehabilitation. 
(aa) "Shelter" means the temporary care of a child in a physically unrestricted facility pending court 
disposition or transfer to another jurisdiction. 
(bb) "State supervision" means a disposition that provides a more intensive level of intervention than 
standard probation but is less intensive or restrictive than a community placement with the Division of 
Juvenile Justice Services. 
(cc) "Substantiated" is as defined in Section 62A-4a-101. 
(dd) "Supported" is as defined in Section 62A-4a-101. 
(ee) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent elimination of all parental rights and 
duties, including residual parental rights and duties, by court order. 
(ff) "Therapist" means: 
(i) a person employed by a state division or agency for the purpose of conducting psychological 
treatment and counseling of a minor in its custody; or 
(ii) any other person licensed or approved by the state for the purpose of conducting psychological 
treatment and counseling. 
(gg) "Unsubstantiated" is as defined in Section 62A-4a-101. 
(hh) "Without merit" is as defined in Section 62A-4a-101. 
(2) As used in Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, with regard to the Division of 
Child and Family Services: 
(a) "Custody" means the custody of a minor in the Division of Child and Family Services as of the 
date of disposition. 
(b) "Protective custody" means the shelter of a child by the Division of Child and Family Services 
from the time the child is removed from home until the earlier of: 
(i) the shelter hearing; or 
(ii) the child's return home. 
(c) "Temporary custody" means the custody of a child in the Division of Child and Family Services 
from the date of the shelter hearing until disposition. 
Amended by Chapter 75, 2006 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 281, 2006 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 97, 2006 General Session 
78-3a-320 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 78 - Judicial Code 
Chapter 03a - Juvenile Court Act of 1996 
78-3a-320 Additional finding at adjudication hearing - Petition - Court records. 
78-3a-320. Additional finding at adjudication hearing — Petition — Court records. 
(1) Upon the filing with the court of a petition under Section 78-3a-305 by the Division of Child and 
Family Services or any interested person informing the court, among other things, that the division has 
made a supported finding that a person committed a severe type of child abuse or neglect as defined in 
Section 62A-4a-1002, the court shall: 
(a) make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated, or without merit; 
(b) include the finding described in Subsection (l)(a) in a written order; and 
(c) deliver a certified copy of the order described in Subsection (l)(b) to the division. 
(2) The judicial finding under Subsection (1) shall be made: 
(a) as part of the adjudication hearing; 
(b) at the conclusion of the adjudication hearing; or 
(c) as part of a court order entered pursuant to a written stipulation of the parties. 
(3) (a) Any person described in Subsection 62A-4a-1010(l) may at any time file with the court a 
petition for removal of the person's name from the Licensing Information System. 
(b) At the conclusion of the hearing on the petition, the court shall: 
(i) make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated, or without merit; 
(ii) include the finding described in Subsection (l)(a) in a written order; and 
(iii) deliver a certified copy of the order described in Subsection (l)(b) to the division. 
(4) A proceeding for adjudication of a supported finding under this section of a type of abuse or 
neglect that does not constitute a severe type of child abuse or neglect may be joined in the juvenile 
court with an adjudication of a severe type of child abuse or neglect. 
(5) If a person whose name appears on the Licensing Information system prior to May 6, 2002 files a 
petition during the time that an alleged perpetrator's application for clearance to work with children or 
vulnerable adults is pending, the court shall hear the matter and enter a final decision no later than 60 
days after the filing of the petition. 
(6) For the purposes of licensing under Sections 26-21-9.5, 26-39-105.5, 62A-1-118, and for the 
purposes described in Section 62A-2-121: 
(a) the court shall make available records of its findings under Subsections (1) and (2) for licensing 
purposes, only to those with statutory authority to access also the Licensing Information System created 
under Section 62A-4a-1006; and 
(b) any appellate court shall make available court records of appeals from juvenile court decisions 
under Subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) for licensing purposes, only to those with statutory authority to 
access also the Licensing Information System. 
Amended by Chapter 77, 2006 General Session 
Rule 52, Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or 
relusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact. 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear 
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fad and 
conclusions of law m rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 58. and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court v/iYnout a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Rule 52. Appeals. 
(a) An appeal may be taken from the juvenile court to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment, order, or decree, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a Notice of Appeal with the clerk of the juvenile court within 30 days after 
the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from. In non-delinquency cases, a Notice of Appeal of a party who 
is not a minor must be signed by each party himself or herself 
(b) An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought, by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal from 
the interlocutory order with the Court of Appeals within 20 days after the entry of the order of the juvenile court. 
(c) The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure shall govern the appeal process, including preparation of the record and 
transcript-
id) No separate order of the juvenile court directing a county to pay transcript costs is required to file a Request for 
Transcript in an appeal by an impecunious party who was represented during the juvenile court proceedings by court-
appointed counsel. 
(e) A party claiming entitlement to court-appointed counsel has a continuing duty to inform the court of any material 
changes that affect indigent status. If at any stage in the trial or appellate proceedings the court makes a finding that a 
party does not qualify, or no longer qualifies for indigent status, the court may order the party to reimburse the county 
or municipality for the reasonable value of the services rendered, including all costs. 
Rule 37. Child protective orders. 
(a) Child protective order proceedings are governed by Section 78-3h-101 et seq. Protective order proceedings may be 
commenced as an independent action by filing a petition. Any interested person may file a petition for a protective 
order on behalf of a child as provided by statute. The petitioner shall first make a referral to the division. If an 
immediate ex parte protective order is requested pending a hearing, the petition or an accompanying affidavit shall set 
forth the facts constituting good cause for issuance of the ex parte order. 
(b) If the petitioner is the agent of a public or private agency, including a law enforcement agency, the petition shall set 
forth the agent's title and the name of the agency that the petitioner represents. 
(c) Petitions for protective orders by a public agency shall not be accepted by the clerk unless reviewed and approved 
by the attorney for the public agency, whose office shall represent the petitioner in such cases. 
(d) The petitioner, if a private person or agency, and the respondent may be represented by retained counsel. Counsel 
may be appointed by the court for an indigent respondent who is a parent, guardian or custodian of the child alleged to 
be abused or threatened with abuse. If the court finds in the hearing that the allegations of the petition have been 
established, the court may assess petitioner's costs and attorney fees against the respondent. If the court finds that the 
petition is without merit, the respondent's costs and attorneys fees may be assessed against petitioner. 
(e) If an ex parte order has been issued, the hearing must be held within 20 days excluding Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays. 
OCT 2 & 2006 
Third District Juvenile Court JmffSm 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Harbaugh, Jason 06-22-1976 
Respondent 
Minutes and Order 
Case No. 513145 
Before Judge Elizabeth A. Lindsley on October 20, 2006 
This case came before the Court for a hearing on the following: 
Case Number 513145, Jason Harbaugh 
2 - PET.FOR PROT,ORDER-MINORS ONLY - Cw - Evidentiary 
3 - CONTEMPT - NON-PECUNIARY - Cw - Pretrial 
MINUTES: 
Present: 
Jason Harbaugh, Respondent; Brianne Cammack-White, Petitioner; Craig Cammack, Petitioner; Diana J. 
Huntsman, Attorney - For The Respondent; Felipe E. Rivera, Attorney - Guardian ad Litem; Sharon 
Cammack, Petitioner; Sidney B. Unrau, Attorney - For The Petitioner, Kris Shaw - Division of Child and 
Family Services; Jason Harbaugh's Fiance, Mother, and Sister 
The Court noted that a second, third, and fourth submission of documentation from Mrs. Huntsman had been 
received by the Court for consideration. 
Mr. Unrau addressed the Court with regard to issuing the protective order. 
Mrs. Huntsman moved the Court to dismiss the protective order based on the petition's failure to meet their 
burden of proof. 
Mr. Rivera addressed the Court with regard to the protective order and noted that the Office of the Guardian ad 
Litem feels that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a protective order being issued. 
Mr. Unrau moved the Court to continue the matter with regards to the Order to Show Cause for further pretrial. 
Mrs, Huntsman informed the Court that under Rule 37 she would be filing an Affidavit of Fees on behalf of her 
client. 
Continued on next page 000 
Page 2 of 2, Jason Harbaugh - 513145 
FINDINGS: 
The Court finds that there has not been sufficient evidence to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence the 
child has been abused or is in imminent threat of being abused. 
ORDERS: 
The ExParte Protective Order is dismissed. 
The Petition For Protective Order is denied. Further, the Child is to be returned to her Father immediately. 
The previous orders entered in District Court regarding visitation between the Mother and the Father will 
remain m effect. 
The Child is to be brought to the West Jordan Courthouse by 3:30 PM October 20, 2006 and is to be returned to 
the Father. 
This matter is set for pretrial with regards to the Order to Show Cause on December 4, 2006 at 1:30 PM, before 
Judge Elizabeth A. Lindsley. 
BY THE COURT 
Digitally signed by „ *' . % ' 
Elizabeth A Lindsley ;/ , ; ' 
and filedon 10-20-2006 * /*•; 
Elizabeth A. Lindsley, Judge 




Sidney B. Unrau 
Diana J. Huntsman 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
JAN 1 j 2007 
3rd Oistrict 
Juvenile Court 
Brianne Cammack-White; Craig 
Cammack; Sharon Cammack 
Petitioner 
vs. 
Harbaugh, Jason 06-22-1976 
Respondent 
FINDINGS AND ORDER REGARDING 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
Case #513145 
Judge Elizabeth A, Lindsley 
This matter came for hearing on December 4, 2006. The Court heard testimony from 
Jason Harbaugh, Sharon Cammack, and Craig Cammack. Regarding the Order to Show Cause 
the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Cammacks and Ms. White were present at the 
hearing before Judge Lyman on August 15, 2006. Judge Lyman ordered that visitation was to 
take place between Oakleigh and Jason Harbaugh every Saturday to be supervised by Wilwin in 
Salt Lake City. Brianne White, Craig and Sharon Cammack knew of the court order. 
The Court finds Craig and Sharon Cammack had the ability to comply with the court 
order regarding visitation. Brianne White did not have the ability to comply. At the hearing on 
August 15,2006 temporary custody of Oakleigh was placed with Craig and Sharon Cammack 
and they were ordered to be responsible for ensuring Oakleigh is made available for parent time 
with her father on Saturday. Brianne White did not have custody of Oakleigh so she did not have 
the ability to comply with the visitation order. 
The Court further finds that Craig and Sharon Cammack willfully and knowingly failed to 
follow the visitation order and refused to do so on September 9, 2006. The missed visits on 
August 19, 2006 and August 26, 2006 were due to confusion on the part of the Cammacks. 
However once the visit occurred in September 2, 2006 there should not have been any confusion 
or misunderstandings. The visits were arranged and the Cammacks did not transport Oakleigh to 
Salt Lake City for the visit on September 9, 2006. 
The Court finds Craig and Sharon Cammack in contempt of court for their violation of 
the visitation order entered on August 15, 2006 by failing to bring Oakleigh for her visit on 
September 9, 2006. 
Regarding the issue of attorneys fees the Court notes that Utah Rule of Juvenile 
Procedure Rule 37 allows for the Court to assess the respondents cost and attorneys fees against 
the petitioner if the Court finds that the petition is without merit. On October 20, 2006 this court 
dismissed the Exparte Protective Order issued August 15, 2006 and denied issuing the Child 
Protective Oder due to the insufficiency of the evidence presented. The respondent has requested 
attorneys fees which are allowed under the rule. The request was accompanied by the affidavits 
of counsel and Mr. Harbaugh. The Court finds the fees request to be reasonable. The respondent 
had to prepare a defense to the Exparte Protective Order. Their preparation was extensive but 
cannot be characterized as unwarranted as the petitioners counsel states in his objection, since 
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respondent had lost temporary custody and needed to prepare to defend himself against allegation 
of abuse. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: 
I. The Court hereby awards attorneys fees and costs to the respondent as outlined in the 
affidavits submitted, in the amount of $19,187.28 for Ms. Huntsmans fees and costs which 
includes the $1,987.00 for the order to show cause. Mr. Harbaugh is awarded his costs of 
$1,252.50 for his expenses. 
Dated the / / day of January, 2007 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Guardian Ad Litem 
DCFS 
Mrs. Diana Huntsman 
3995 South 700 East Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Mr. Sidney Unrau 
3610 North University Avenue Suite 375 
Provo, UT 84604 
Mr. Jason Harbaugh 
5674 West Shady Stone Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Mr & Mrs Cammack 
247 East Center Street 
Fayette, UT 84630 
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